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AN ANALYSIS OF U.S.-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1980s:
HAS ENGAGEMENT BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE?
Sheila M. HOPKINS *
1. Introduction
Each trade agreement, each bank loan, each new investment is another brick in the wall of
our continued existence [1].
LB. Vorster, former Prime Minister of South Africa
We cannot and will not permit our hand to be forced to align ourselves with one side or an
other .... Our task ... is to maintain communication with all parties ... and to pursue our
growing interest throughout the region.
Only if we engage constructively in southern Africa as a whole can we play our proper
role in the search for negotiated solutions, peaceful change and expanding economic
progress.
The Reagan Administration has no intention of destabilizing South Africa in order to
curry favor elsewhere. Neither will we align ourselves with apartheid policies that are
abhorrent to our own multiracial democracy [2].
Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
This Comment will evaluate the Reagan Administration's foreign policy in
South Africa in light of American business interests and the South African
government's recent efforts to improve both its foreign and domestic relations.
Considerable attention will center on both the new South African Constitution,
passed in November 1983, and on the Sullivan Principles [3], a code of conduct
for American businesses operating in South Africa. The success or failure of
the Constitution and the Principles will indicate the likelihood that the Reagan
Administration's policy will help achieve reform of South African apartheid
policies [4].
The phase "constructive engagement" [5] is used to describe the Reagan
Administration's policy in South Africa. Officially, the Reagan Administration
has adopted a neutral policy of neither promoting nor discouraging American
business activities [6]. In practice, however, the Reagan Administration has
encouraged economic ties with South Africa, paying scant attention to invest-
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ment neutrality. For example, in March 1982 the Administration relaxed
certain export controls imposed in 1978 by the Carter Administration [7].
These had been enacted pursuant to the U.N. Security Council's adoption of a
mandatory arms-embargo resolution in 1977 [8]. The State Department stated
that the earlier military and police embargo "was too widely cast to achieve its
objective" [9]. According to the American Chamber of Commerce in South
Africa, it is expected that these relaxations will have a "substantial effect" on
U.S. business [10].
2. U.S. business involvement in South Africa
The legitimacy of the U.S. government's interest in American business
activity abroad is an underlying assumption of this examination [11]. American
companies, however, generally avoid identification with political goals [12].
American business leaders steadfastly resist being used by the executive branch
as foreign policy tools [13]. George J. Vojta, Executive Vice President of
Citicorp, stated that, "the conduct of American foreign policy is and ought to
be the sole prerogative of the U.S. Government ... [W]e believe it is wrong to
try to use American business as the cutting edge of American foreign policy"
[14]. Nevertheless, according to Ted J. Smale, Executive Director of AECI
Ltd., South Africa's largest chemical company, and President of the Johannes-
burg Chamber of Commerce, "[Y]ou can't divorce economics from politics,
particularly in a place like this" [15].
While in absolute terms the United States' economic interest in the Republic
is relatively small [16], it assumes a disproportionate significance because of
U.S. prestige, economic power, and support of democracy and racial equality.
The pressures exerted by special interest groups [17] and by other African
states further highlight American involvement.
Approximately 350 of the most prominent companies in the United States,
including more than half of the Fortune 500's top one hundred firms, operate
subsidiaries in South Africa [18]. Another 6000 do business there through sales
agents and distributers [19]. The United States holds fifty-seven percent of all
foreign holdings on the Johannesburg stock exchange, including gold mines,
mining houses, platinum mines, and diamonds [20]. The State Department
estimated that U.S. direct investment amounted to $2.3 billion in 1983, down
from the $2.8 billion calculated by the South African Institute of Race
Relations for 1982 [21]. Other estimates put overall American investment,
including loans and gold stocks, at $14 billion [22].
For the typical American company operating in the Republic, investments
constitute less than one percent of total assets. U.S. majority-owned corpora-
tions account for three percent of the annual capital spent in South Africa for
new equipment and replacement of old equipment [23]. In 1978, these busi-
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nesses spent $300 million of an $11.4 billion gross domestic investment in
South Africa [24]. About eighty-five percent of these expenditures were fi-
nanced through depreciation and retained earnings. Thus, U.S. parent compa-
nies invested relatively little external capital. A cutoff of this investment would
reduce the Republic's gross domestic investment by less than one-half of one
percent [25].
U.S. exports to South Africa, however, grew from approximately R1.2
billion in 1979 to R2.7 billion in 1981 [26]. As a result, the United States
emerged as the Republic's largest trading partner [27]. Apart from its quantita-
tive impact, U.S. business investment has a qualitative impact disproportionate
to its financial value. Since large multinational corporations comprise the bulk
of the U.S. business commitment, American business assessments of invest-
ment opportunities influence other countries' foreign investments and loan
capital decisions [28]. U.S. investment, furthermore, is directed toward critical
sectors of the South African economy, thereby promoting increased high
technology transfers and industrial expansion [29]. Key investment areas
include the automobile industry, where U.S. firms hold a fifty percent market
share; petroleum, forty-one percent [30]; and computers, approximately sixty-
five percent [31].
Foreign capital and trade have been vital ingredients in the economic
development of South Africa. Investments and business transactions have
provided valuable foreign exchange necessary for industrialization and growth
of an increasingly capital-intensive economy [321. The Republic's imports of
goods and services have equalled about one-third of overall gross national
product [33]. Although expanding exports, primarily agricultural products and
minerals, have offset a portion of increasing import costs, South Africa has
incurred a balance-of-payments deficit on current account in eight of the last
ten years [34]. This situation has worsened in the past two years because of the
decline in the price of gold, South Africa's greatest source of export income,
and the severe drought which forced the country to import maize, another
important source of export income [35]. South Africa has relied upon loans
and foreign investment to cover these deficits and to supplement domestic
savings. Consequently, loans and foreign investment have become increasingly
important to the economy [36].
2.1. Critics of American policy in South Africa
A number of commentators, who support the continued presence of
American business interests in South Africa, contend that the U.S. government
and American businesses should adopt a more active role in supporting reform
[37]. According to these critics, U.S. investment is (1) vitally important to the
Republic and (2) this dependence can be exploited to foster reform [38]. Simon
Brand, the Prime Minister's Economic Adviser, legitimized this argument by
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characterizing foreign investment as the "engine of growth in South Africa,
responsible in the past for one-third of the country's annual growth rate" [39].
Similarly, a former director of Barclay's National Bank of South Africa
acknowledged that foreign investment figures underestimate South African
dependence on American investments by failing to reflect the "know-how"
skills generally associated with foreign investment [40].
Other critics of American business in South Africa, however, argue that the
combination of (1) the U.S. business presence and (2) the high level of political
dialogue between the two countries bolsters apartheid [41]. The Reverend
Jessie L. Jackson characterized the Reagan Administration's policy in South
Africa as "an act of barbarism that permits American firms to reap profits
from the cheap labor created by that nation's apartheid system" [42]. One
South African official stated, "[i]f not exactly the Good Housekeeping seal of
approval, the presence of companies like Ford and GM is at least a sign of
international support"[43]. Senator Dick Clark, chairman of the Subcommittee
on African Affairs, stated in a January 1978 report to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee:
Collectively, U.S. companies operating in South Africa have made no significant impact on
either relaxing apartheid or in establishing company policies which would offer a limited
but nevertheless important model of multinational responsibility. Rather, the net effect of
American investment has been to strengthen the economic and military self-sufficiency of
South Africa's apartheid regime [44].
The relationship between economic development and internal stability was
clearly recognized in the Republic's economic development program for
1978-87. According to the program, "a strong and vital economy is one of
South Africa's best weapons against the coordinated onslaught being launched
against her from outside her borders on the political, economic, military, and
psychological fronts" [45].
2.2. Capacity of U.S. companies to initiate reform
Commentators on South Africa disagree on the effectiveness of any pressure
American businesses can exert to reform apartheid. South Africa's Finance
Minister, Owen Horwood, contends that "South Africa will certainly not be
forced to its knees by divestment of American capital, whatever that vague
notion may mean and however it is supposed to be brought about" [46]. In a
recent interview, Foreign Minister Roelof Frederik "Pik" Botha maintained
that South Africa must be considered "a regional power with which the rest of
the world must deal, like us or not" [47]. Moreover, he added, "whether the
world or the United States likes us or not is of little concern to me" [48].
Foreign investment accounts for only eighteen to nineteen percent of total
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investment in South Africa [49]. Because new U.S. investment is only one-half
of one percent of total U.S. investment, and the general trend toward new
investment is down, disinvestment would be of little consequence. In addition,
the gap would soon be filled by foreign competitors [50]. In 1978, U.S. imports
from the Republic constituted four percent of that country's gross domestic
product (GDP) [51]. A cutoff of American imports, assuming alternative
markets could not be found, would reduce South Africa's GDP by approxi-
mately twelve percent [52]. This, however, is an unlikely scenario. Gold and
diamonds are easily marketed elsewhere. In addition, the United States would
incur considerable costs by halting such raw material imports [53].
Nevertheless, some businessmen argue that American-South African trade
and investment assumes a constructive role in South Africa by providing
capital which in turn stimulates growth, jobs, and improved labor practices
[54]. William C. Norris, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
Control Data Corporation, emphasized that "[t]o limit or restrict the job-creat-
ing potential of the U.S. companies in South Africa is to put a lid on the
possibility for meaningful employment for many Black South Africans. Eco-
nomic growth is the means to providing new jobs for Black South Africans"
[55]. John Purcell of Goodyear concurred, asserting that economic pressures
will not encourage nonviolent social change in South Africa; rather, this will be
brought about by "economic growth, expanded contact with the outside, and
time" [56].
Some businessmen acknowledge, however, that a high growth rate is not the
panacea that some free marketers believe [57]. Morton Dagut, Deputy General
Manager of Nedbank, one of the leading banks in South Africa, remarked that,
"[A]ll our old problems of inflation, shortage of key skills, inadequate social
infrastructure, the juxtaposition of the haves and have-nots, of urban crowding
and rural poverty have not and will not just go away because the growth rate is
high" [58]. Two basic limitations of the "trickle down" theory of economic
progress in South Africa are the increasingly capital-intensive nature of invest-
ment and the apartheid policy itself. An examination of Caltex, a corporation
jointly-owned by Texaco and Standard Oil of California, typifies these prob-
lems.
Between 1962 and 1977, South Africa underwent a period of tremendous
economic growth, yet Black workers failed to receive appreciable benefits. In
1962, Caltex employed 2400 workers in South Africa, 776 of whom were Black,
constituting 32.3% of the labor force. By June 1977, employment had been
reduced through modernization to 1,953 people, 452 of whom were Black,
representing 23% of the work force. During these fifteen years of high
economic growth, Caltex reduced its total labor force by 18.6%, while cutting
back its Black labor force by 41.8% [59].
The recent employment history of Caltex is convincing exception to the
two-prong argument that additional capital investment will increase benefits to
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Black workers and, conversely, that divestment will disproportionately harm
Black workers. Moreover, the South African educational system fails to
provide Blacks with adequate instruction and facilities. In an increasingly
capital-intensive workplace where advanced skills are a prerequisite to
meaningful employment, this policy ensures that Black laborers will be the last
hired and the first fired [60]. As a result, foreign investment cannot fundamen-
tally improve the lives of Black South Africans until apartheid is rejected [61].
The limited number of Black workers employed by U.S. companies in South
Africa is another factor restricting the effectiveness of an economic solution to
apartheid. The total number of South Africans of all races working in
American firms is less than one percent of the labor force, approximately
80,000. Although estimates vary, thirty to forty thousand of these employees
are Black [62]. Assuming, arbitrarily, that among Black families one worker
supports five, U.S. companies indirectly affect the lives of 150,000 to 200,000
Blacks. While this number is significant in human terms, it is a small per-
centage of the total Black population in South Africa [63].
Once the limitations involved in any economic reform of South African
apartheid policies are recognized, American businesses must address three
questions. First, to what extent can American businesses play a constructive
role in reform? Second, does this role justify continued involvement in the
Republic? Third, what costs would American businesses and South Africans
incur in the event of divestment?
The activities of U.S. businesses are constrained by the increasingly compe-
titive nature of the South African economy [64]. American firms vie with
foreign firms and local competitors in virtually every field [65]. IBM, for
example, competes for market shares of the computer industry with ICL, the
British computer company, and Siemens, a German firm [66]. Similarly, Ford
and GM recognize that their withdrawal from the motor vehicle market would
have little impact on the economy [67]. Furthermore, South Africa has sought
to guarantee itself a more stable technologies transfer flow. Although a cutoff
in Western technology would adversely affect the Republic, the impact would
be mitigated by provisions such as the 1978 Patent Act. This law allows South
African businesses to violate patent rights of overseas holders refusing to make
their technology available [68].
Corporate leaders justify business investment in South Africa on the grounds
that (1) it is not the prerogative of private firms to sit in judgment of the
domestic affairs of foreign countries [69]; (2) business organizations have an
obligation to their shareholders to make profits, not moral pronouncements
[70]; (3) Black South Africans and the neighboring Black states would bear the
brunt of the economic dislocation resulting from divestment [71]; (4) the
United States is dependent upon South African products, including chrome,
manganese, platinum, uranium, gold, diamonds, and other minerals 72]; and
(5) there are many other foreign countries who would replace the United States
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and who would be less committed to reform [73]. The Sullivan Principles,
which will be analyzed in section 2.3, infra, provide a backdrop against which
the success of "constructive engagement" can be assessed.
Approximately 50,000 jobs in the United States depend upon South African
exports [74]. In real terms, the jobs lost in the United States would be
compounded by the income-maintenance provisions of the U.S. economic
system. Estimates of total loss from such welfare programs as unemployment
compensation, food stamps, medical care expenditures, and decreased tax
revenue are in the one billion dollar range [75]. Any corporate decision to
withdraw from South Africa must also account for the costs of repatriating
investment funds. The Republic's foreign exchange regulations make the
transfer of money received from the sale of assets costly. Unless the assets are
purchased by another foreign investor, who is unlikely to pay top price,
proceeds of sale must be invested for a period of up to five years in
low-interest South African securities or government bonds [76]. An equally
unattractive alternative is the possibility of exchanging rands for dollars at a
discounted rate, ranging from a twenty to forty percent discount [77].
2.3. The Sullivan Principles
The Sullivan Principles are one notable example of American business
reform within the South African workplace and improvement in the lives of
employees. This U.S. corporate code of conduct was publicly introduced in
1977, developed under the leadership of Revered Leon H. Sullivan, a promi-
nent Black civil rights leader and board member of General Motors. The
Sullivan Principles pledged the original twelve signatories to work toward the
desegregation of the workplace, fair employment procedures, equal pay for
equal work, job training and promotion, and improvement in the quality of life
[78].
Initially, the Principles were warmly received. By the end of 1978, 105
companies had signed, and by October 1981 the number had risen to 144.
Signatory firms employed eighty-five percent of the South African workforce
working in U.S. subsidiary companies in 1979. The State Department heralded
the Principles "as a potentially major force for change in South Africa,"
pledging the "strong support" of the U.S. government [79].
By April 1979, however, increasing numbers of American Black leaders
began questioning the efficacy of the Sullivan Principles. This disillusionment
was expressed by religious leaders who met in New York to consider U.S.
policy in South Africa. The overwhelming majority of the 200 representatives
rejected the Principles, describing them as "well-intentioned [but] no longer
sufficient" [80]. They found "that the very presence of the United States
corporations in South Africa serves to legitimize the apartheid system of white
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supremacy" [81]. The clergyment committed themselves to working toward
total disengagement [82].
Current views on the Sullivan Principles are sharply divided. Much of the
"easy work," such as initial desegregation of the work force, is now completed
[83]. Promotion of Blacks into managerial positions, however, has not yet been
implemented. American firms have been hesitant to proceed in this area,
fearing the consequences of antagonizing White workers who strongly resist
such management directives [84]. The Study Commission on United States
Policy toward Southern Africa, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, concluded
in 1981:
Although the Sullivan Principles and the other codes have changed employment practices,
company reform has not been of "massive proportions." Nor has compliance with the
codes threatened the basic structure of apartheid. The state role in the labor market,
particularly state control over African labor, is virtually unaffected [85].
On November 9, 1983, more than 100 U.S. firms with South African
investments met in closed session to formulate policy. "We've come to a kind
of crossroads," stated James Rawlings, chairman of Union-Carbide South
Africa, Inc. "[T]he easy issues, like desegregation in the workplace and equal
pay for equal work, are pretty much behind us now. It's time to refocus our
efforts, and figure out how we can be most effective on the harder issues, like
education, community development and black entrepreneurship" [86].
How have U.S. firms measured up against other foreign and domestic firms
in South Africa? Many have treated their nonwhite workers better than South
African companies, yet, on the whole their record has not been remarkable
[87]. A recent study of British, American, and South African businesses
revealed that all three were still paying salaries below the minimum standard
poverty level in South Africa [88]. William Degenring of American Cyanamid
noted that "a lot of South African companies are a hell of a lot better [about
non-White employee compensation] than U.S. companies" [89].
The superficiality of the changes instituted by the Sullivan Principles is one
of its major criticisms. For example, some companies replaced segregation of
dining or locker facilities by race with segregation by workers' status, i.e.,
hourly or salaried workers. Cafeterias, bathrooms, and locker rooms formerly
assigned to non-Whites were redesignated for hourly workers. Similarly, White
facilities were alloted to salaried workers or artisans. Because companies had
few, if any, salaried Blacks or hourly Whites, segregation was preserved [90]. In
one case, General Motors replaced "offending" signs on bathroom doors,
explicitly designating race, with new color-coded doors: blue for Whites and
orange for Blacks and Coloureds [91].
The Principles have also been criticized for leaving intact the basic frame-
work of apartheid [92]. This has been cited as a reason why the South African
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government acquiesced to the Principles. Donald McHenry of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace emphasized the Principles' failure to
substantially improve conditions. No matter how commendable General Mo-
tors' employment programs are, he noted, and no matter how many housing
and educational opportunities are provided, Blacks still must live in prescribed
areas and are still unable to move about freely. Furthermore, less than one
percent of the Black population rises to a level where they can take advantage
of the high school scholarship programs [93]. Reverend Sullivan himself
expressed his disappointment:
I am not satisfied with the overall pace of implementation by the companies. Some of the
companies are doing far better than others; 20 percent are pulling hard, 50 percent are
pulling, and the rest are just being pulled along. And a whole lot of them are not even on
the wagon yet [94).
3. South African legal responses to foreign pressures
3.1. Shielding statutes
An analysis of constructive engagement would be incomplete without con-
sidering the nature and degree of South African governmental reactions.
Typically, the South African government responds to sanctions and threats of
further controls by enacting legislation mitigating foreseeable effects. For
example, in response to foreign sanction campaigns, the Parliament passed the
National Supplies Procurement Act [951, empowering the Minister of Eco-
nomic Affairs to order any firm to produce upon demand any product the
government deems necessary to national security. If a company refuses, the
government "may, without legal process, seize the goods in question" or take
over the company's production processes. General Motors Chairman Charles
Murphy highlighted the ramifications of this law:
It is apparent to us that manufacturing plants involved in such basic industries as petroleum
production and refining, mining primary metals, transportation, and machinery - industries
which generate the lifeblood of any economy - also assume equally strategic importance in
time of emergency. Any of our plants can be converted to war production as clearly
demonstrated in the United States in 1941 [96].
3.2. Constitutional developments
No nation, no people, can thrive on hate. No nation can build the future on hate. [97] - South
African Prime Minister P.W. Botha.
The most recent example of the South African government's response to a
combination of foreign and domestic pressures is to be found in its new
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Constitution, accepted by 65.95% of the White population on November 2,
1983 [98]. Ironically, the 2.8 million Coloureds and 800,000 Indians, identified
as the principal beneficiaries of this enactment, were not allowed to vote in the
referendum.
The passage of the new Constitution raises two fundamental questions.
First, what does this plan mean for all South Africans - White, Black, Indian,
and Coloured [99]? Second, to what extent does the Constitution cast doubt on
the continued liability of constructive engagement as a means of encouraging
racial reform? The basic issue is whether the Constitution will initiate construc-
tive change and the eventual dismantlement of apartheid or whether it will
further entrench White-dominated governance through the facade of reform
[100].
The ratification of the South African Constitution split the Nationalist
Party [101], the leading political party since 1948, into two factions, the
mainstream element led by Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha and the breakaway
Conservative Party led by Dr. Andries P. Teurnicht [102]. It pitted those who
believe reform is necessary for survival against those who assert that any
dismantling of apartheid will ultimately lead to "racial suicide" by the White
population [103]. Dr. P.J. Barnard, a Conservative Party referendum agent,
warned, "[t]his Constitution removes color as a criterion, and so it will lead to
black, Marxist government. We have seen what happened in the rest of Africa"
[104].
Prime Minister P.W. Botha stated that the ratification of the Constitution
indicates a "decisive majority in favor of the attempt to secure security, peace,
stability and prosperity for South Africa .... The Government now feels
strengthened to go ahead with proper and evolutionary reform for South
Africa!' [105]. Brand Fourie, South African Ambassador to the United States,
announced, "[r]eform and stability: these are the key words of the South
African mandate. Reform encompasses all minority groups in South Africa"
[106].
When the particular provisions are examined closely, however, it becomes
apparent that the fundamental precept of the new Constitution, like its
predecessor, is the division of the population into distinct racial groups and the
land into areas in which one or more groups receive preferential treatment
[107]. Robert J. Rotberg, Professor of Political Science and History at M.I.T.,
observed:
South Africa after the referendum is much as South Africa was before last week's vote. Its
vast majority is poor, alienated, and angry. Its Coloreds and Asians are wary and fearful,
and its whites are no more secure than they were before. The new constitution and the new
parliament ... address none of the fundamental problems of a still bitterly divided country
[108].
John Kane Berman, Director of the liberal South African Institute of Race
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Relations, asserted that the "problem with this Constitution is that it won't
advance that process [of eventually including Blacks in government] so much
as retard it by introducing new stumbling blocks in the path of a common
society" [1091.
Examination of the Constitution [110] reveals that, contrary to official
pronouncements, power has become more centralized and less subject to
checks and balances than under the previous Constitution [111]. Part III of the
Constitution, for example, outlines the State President's powers. The State
President assumes not only his former powers, but also those of the Prime
Minister, among others. This makes the State President the most powerful
person in the Republic. Importantly, the State President is not subject to the
will of the legislature, unlike the parliamentary system of government followed
in Great Britain, nor is he directly elected by the electorate, as in the French
and American systems. If Parliament passes a no-confidence vote in his
Cabinet, or if such a vote is passed by one or more of the Houses, he can
dissolve Parliament or the House concerned and call a new election [112]. This
is a marked departure from the old system under which the Prime Minister was
a Member of and responsible to the House of Assembly. At any time during
the life of a Parliament he could have been rejected by the provincial
congresses of the majority party, thereby losing his position as Prime Minister.
The most important and controversial power granted the State President is
his duty under section 16 [113] to classify matters affecting a particular
population group as "own affairs" [114], or matters affecting all racial groups
as "general affairs" [115]. Section 14 states:
Matters which specifically or differentially affect a population group in relation to the
maintenance of its identity and the upholding and furtherance of its way of life, culture,
traditions and customs are subject to the provisions of section 16, own affairs in relation to
such population group [116).
The State President's decisions, here, are not subject to review by any court of
law [117].
In effect, these sections entrench apartheid policy. "Own affairs" are
defined purely on racial grounds as those affairs considered to be the separate
concern of each of the three groups involved - Whites, Coloureds, and Indians.
It includes such matters as social welfare, education, art, culture and rec-
reation, housing, agriculture, and even water supply [118]. General affairs
include foreign policy, defense, law and order, and state security [119]. This
division prevents the Coloured and Indian Minister's Councils from acting on
many vital concerns affecting their own population groups, including removal
of certain racial groups from living areas designated for other racial groups as
well as other apartheid laws and practices [120]. The State President, for
example, can prohibit the Coloured Minister in charge of Coloured Education
from opening schools to White or Black students [121].
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The day-to-day operation of government will also reflect the continued
vitality of apartheid. In practice, the three Houses representing the three
population groups will function separately [122]. Their only contact with each
other will be limited to joint standing committees dealing with general affairs.
Many constitutional critics contend that the system will prove to be a source
of continuous friction. The Progressive Federal Party (PFP), opposed to the
Constitution, argues that White liberalism in South Africa will lose all credibil-
ity by reinforcing the view among Blacks that it is "pointless" to look to
Whites for nonviolent change [1231. As Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, leader of
the PFP, explained: "The real issue in South Africa is Black-White co-ex-
istence. And the willingness to negotiate stands a better chance of surviving
with a 'no' vote" [124]. One PFP member concluded, "They [the Coloureds
and Indians] are being made collaborators in applying apartheid to themselves"
[125]. The government's view, on the contrary, is optimistic. Supporters claim
the constitution will allow the different population groups an opportunity to
determine their own affairs and to share co-responsibility for common con-
cerns [126].
Considerable criticism is also leveled at the constitutional provision in-
volving the President's Council [127]. This body consists of twenty members
from the House of Assembly (White), ten members chosen from the House of
Representatives (Coloured), five members designated by the House of De-
legates (Indian), and twenty-five members appointed by the State President
[128]. The new Council, although not accountable to the electorate, assumes a
legislative role when the three Houses of Parliament cannot agree on a bill. The
Council's deadlock-breaking function under section 78 allows it to ratify a bill,
despite the fact that only one of the Parliament Houses may have approved it
[129]. In effect, the Council has greater legislative powers than any of the
Houses or even Parliament itself. The Council's power is limited only by its
inability to introduce legislative amendments [130].
The most egregious provision of the new Constitution is the purposeful
exclusion of Blacks, the vast majority of the South African population, from
any degree of power-sharing and decision-making [131]. Section 93 vests
control and representation of Black interests in the State President, "who shall
exercise all those special powers in regard to Black Administration which
immediately before the commencement of this Act were vested in him ... "
[132].
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, a prominent Zulu leader, addressed PFP members
on the eve of the election and strongly urged rejection of the Constitution. "It
is in your power to salvage the country from the kind of politics which those
who have been sentenced to political death will begin to indulge in" [133], he
said, referring to the future polarization of nonfranchised Blacks from the rest
of the country under the "new dispensation" [134]. "It is up to you to salvage
the country from the politics of anger" [135]. When the Constitution was
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passed, Chief Buthelezi called the Coloured Labor Party's decision to par-
ticipate in the new parliament "'a slap in the face' for blacks" [1361. Frederick
van Zyl Slabbert of the PFP agreed. "Even if against all odds the new
constitution operates successfully for Coloreds and Asians," he argued, "the
very success would be a source of alienation and frustration for the majority of
Blacks" [137].
Although limited provision has been made for Coloured and Indian par-
ticipation under the new Constitution, prominent Coloured and Indian leaders
have expressed concern over the cost of these benefits. When the proposals
were first introduced in 1977, D.M.G. Curry of the recently disbanded
Coloured Persons' Representative Council articulated several objections:
The proposals are there to entrench apartheid in the constitution by preserving the ethnic
divisions of Coloureds and Indians and Whites. We see the plan as a subterfuge for using
Coloureds and Indians as tools to entrench exclusive National Party rule. By effectively
excluding opposition political parties, which are necessary in a truly democratic society, the
plans aim at entrusting dictatorial powers to the State President by giving the person elected
to this post wide powers to affect the lives of South Africans [1381.
The Constitution has preserved the statutory underpinnings of apartheid, such
as the Group Areas Act [1391, Influx control [140], the Immorality Act [141],
and security legislation [142] which severely restrict opportunities for peaceful
reform [143]. Prime Minister Botha's Foreign Minister, Roelof F. Botha,
claimed that the retention of security laws was necessary to protect the rule of
law from "those who have no interest in democracy" [144].
4. The United States' response
The continued viability of the Reagan Administration's policy of construc-
tive engagement has been linked by commentators and Congress to the success
of the South African Constitution and South Africa's relations with neighbor-
ing states. Immediately prior to the constitutional referendum, The Christian
Science Monitor reported that "[w]hile the debate impacts on both whites and
blacks in South Africa, the results ... have direct consequences for the Reagan
Administration's policy of 'constructive engagement'..." [145]. The pronoun-
cements of Prime Minister P.W. Botha underscore the relationship between the
constitutional developments and the Reagan Administration's policy of con-
structive engagement. Botha predicted ratification would have a "big influence
internationally" [146], and following the referendum, he stated that the results
would foster "a better understanding" with the Reagan Administration [147].
The U.S. State Department responded to the election results by "welcom[ing]
the outcome of South Africa's referendum of a new constitution," and assert-
ing that it "opened the way toward a system based on the consent of all South
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African citizens" [148]. The referendum was described as "a potentially
significant date in the modern history of South Africa" [149].
South Africa's recent attempts to normalize relations with neighboring
Black states such as Mozambique and Angola have also been characterized as
significant [150]. Progress on Angola began on December 6, 1983, when
Chester A. Crocker met with South African Foreign Minister, R.F. Botha.
Thereafter, Crocker's deputy, Frank Wisner, and Angolan Vice Foreign Minis-
ter, Antonio da Moura, met and agreed that Angola would prevent its forces,
along with those of the Cuban and Namibian rebels, from taking advantage of
a South African military withdrawal. Following the Angolan commitment,
Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha announced a thirty-day disengagement on
January 31, 1984 [151]. The United States assumed a critical role in the
tripartite talks in Lusaka that established a joint commission to monitor the
disengagement [152].
The Reagan Administration's recent successes in southern Africa have led
some commentators to reconsider the policy of constructive engagement [153].
Others, however, have steadfastly pointed out the limitations of both the
constitutional and regional developments in southern Africa. As Representa-
tive Howard Wolpe (D. Mich.) noted, "Unfortunately, these optimistic ap-
praisals may, in the end, make American diplomacy in southern Africa
increasingly irrelevant to achieving regional stability, as people and govern-
ments throughout Africa perceive that America has entered into a long-term
accommodation with apartheid" [154].
Glenn Frankel of The Washington Post noted that on the same day U.S.
diplomats were orchestrating peace talks between South Africa and Angola,
the South African police were uprooting residents of Mogope, a small African
village near Johannesburg, and sending them to a government-designated area
for Blacks [155]. The move was completed despite a strong protest by the
United States [156]. More recently, on October 23, 1984, seven thousand South
African army troops and police officers raided Sebokeng and three other Black
townships [1571. Eighteen thousand homes were searched and 357 Blacks were
arrested [158]. This operation was the most sweeping of its kind since the
South African government announced, on October 7, 1984, that the army
would be employed to aid the police in combating unrest in Black townships
[159]. The Azania People's Organization and the United Democratic Front,
two leading antiapartheid groups, termed the "crackdown" a declaration of
war [160]. John Hughes, the State Department spokesman, responded to these
events with a statement criticizing the underpinnings of constructive engage-
ment [161]. "These repressive measures are bound to obscure and put in
question the South African government's professed intentions of dealing with
the problems of the country by reform and consensus" [162].
The events described above highlight the limitations of constructive engage-
ment. While the United Statees may score points by influencing South Africa's
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relations with her neighbors, the United States has "extremely limited leverage"
over the internal developments of South Africa [163]. One American diplomat
conceded, off-the-record, that constructive engagement had little to offer
Blacks within South Africa. "There's admittedly not a whole hell of a lot this
Administration has to say to black South Africa. Essentially we've opted for a
policy that may yield benefits in 20 or 25 years. That's pretty thin gruel" [164].
The official pronouncements of Prime Minister Botha also reveal the
limitations of the Constitution, thereby calling into question the rationales
supporting constructive engagement. Botha has repeatedly stressed that the
Constitution would not depart from Nationalist policies [165]. It does not
include a "hidden agenda," he promised Afrikaners, to later include Blacks
once the referendum is over [166]. "That is a story created by people who do
not want to read my programs as announced" [167]. Botha's assurance of
continued White supremacy was reinforced by the promise of Professor Jan de
Lange, Chairman of the Broederbond, an unofficial but influential organiza-
tion behind the Nationalist Party. "The policy of apartheid, or separate
development of the races as it is called today," he maintained, "is not under
question" [168].
5. Conclusions
Although unexplored options remain, it appears constructive engagement
has failed. One of its basic premises is the belief that increased communication
and trade between the United States and South Africa would eventually foster
internal reform [169]. To the extent there has been communication and
"constructive criticism" between the two countries, however, apartheid reform
has been absent.
On June 24, 1983, the United States released its most comprehensive
evaluation of the South African situation in nearly two years. It was an effort
to counter criticism that the Administration had been "too soft" and had been
"offering too many carrots" to the Republic [170]. In a strongly worded
speech, Laurence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
characterized the South African political system as "morally wrong" [171]. He
went on to say that the United States "stand[s] against injustice, and therefore
... must reject the legal and political premises and consequences of apartheid"
[172]. He attacked the South African government's "attempts to denationalize
the black South African majority" and the "repression of organizations and
individuals by means of Administrative measures like banning and detention
without due process of law" [173].
Prime Minister Botha responded to Eagleburger's criticisms by accusing the
United States of attempting to "dictate to South Africa how blacks ... should
be governed there" [174]. Botha also pointed out the "central misconception"
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of U.S. policy in South Africa [175]. According to Botha, the Reagan Adminis-
tration acts upon the presumption that the Republic is a unitary state con-
sisting of a South African nation with a "Black majority" and a "White
minority" [176].
This recent dialogue reveals the limitations of any policy relying upon
communication and constructive criticism of South Africa's policies. A "meet-
ting of the minds" is impossible when there is no agreement on basic working
assumptions. David Welsh, a political scientist at the University of Cape
Town, summarized the problem:
South Africa in many important respects has abused "constructive engagement" by using it
as an umbrella to do what they damn well like in the region and get off with, at worst, a
wrist-slapping from Washington. If the bottom line of "constructive engagement" is, as it
must be, real change inside South Africa, then you can forget it [1771.
Not only has the policy of constructive engagement failed to achieve its
objectives, but it may have adverse consequences for long-term relations
between the United States and South Africa. Franklin H. Williams, President
of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, an educational 'institution, stated, "The ultimate
folly of such a policy [constructive engagement] for the United States is that
favor is being won with the wrong people. The so-called reforms applauded by
the Reagan Administration are merely cosmetic changes in a system deeply
entrenched and jealously guarded by 'white' South Africa" [178]. One U.S.
foundation analyst working in South Africa reported, "anti-Americanism is
slopping over everything .... I have found it much more difficult to work in
South Africa since the Reagan Administration took office. The United States
has never been on the right side of the black community, but this [policy shift]
has made things worse" [179]. American approval of the constitutional provi-
sions has served to exacerbate an already shaky relationship [180].
Congress, too, has become disenchanted with the Reagan Administration's
policy [181]. The passage of the Constitution and the remarks of Prime
Minister Botha have heightened concern. Representative Stephen J. Solarz (D.
N.Y.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, asserted that Botha's
denial of a fundamental realignment of Nationalist Party thinking "shows the
South African government has no intention of fundamentally changing the
apartheid system and that the Administration is naive to think otherwise"
[182]. "Constructive engagement," Solarz concluded, has "turned out to be the
flop and failure we always thought it would be..." [183]. Representative
Howard Wolpe concurred, stating, "Constructive engagement has unintention-
ally reinforced South Africa's segregationist policies and caused an increase in
domestic repression" [184].
While there has been harsh criticism of constructive engagement, there is
little consensus regarding alternative U.S. policy [185]. The United States has
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significant interests in the region including (1) assuring long-term access to
strategic minerals [186]; (2) foreclosing Soviet influence [187]; (3) preserving
the Cape Sea route [188]; (4) maintaining commercial relations with South
Africa and the rest of Africa [189]; and (5) supporting human rights and
human dignity. The U.S. government has assumed until now that these
objectives would best be served by supporting the White minority government
and attempting to encourage reforms that would not upset the stability of the
region. The outspoken criticism of Black leaders, the increasing incidence of
domestic violence, and the mounting dissatisfaction with the Sullivan Princi-
ples and other economic reform measures, however, casts doubt upon the
professed rationale for continued U.S. involvement.
The U.S. government may pursue two policy options in South Africa. The
government can acknowledge the structural limitations of constructive engage-
ment, and, if it is committed to abolishing apartheid, apply increasing levels of
pressure against the South African government. Such measures would include
export and loan restrictions, conditioning U.S. business operations in South
Africa upon compliance with the Sullivan Principles, and, if necessary, divesti-
ture. On the other hand, if the U.S. government is committed to a less activist
foreign policy stance, it must ensure that voters and shareholders receive
complete and accurate information. While the Reagan Administration has
generally followed a "hands off' attitude toward investment and trade, distor-
tions and omissions of critical information have disabled the American public
from objectively evaluating U.S. involvement in South Africa.
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A diagrammatic representation of South Africa's new constitution. The tricameral Parliament
will consist.of 308 members. Each of the three Houses will deal exclusively with measures affecting
their population groups.
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